Alternatives for Financing Social Security in Luxembourg by Resident and Cross-Border Households
- Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research/LISER, Luxembourg
Cite this article
as: P. Liégeois; 2026; Alternatives for Financing Social Security in Luxembourg by Resident and Cross-Border Households; International Journal of Microsimulation; 19(2); 112-138.
doi: 10.34196/ijm.00340
Figures
Figure 1
Share of employees, based on their average earnings compared to the MSW, in % of employees with positive (>0) labor earnings [*] (MSW = 1998.59 EUR / month in 2017).
Figure 2
Share of fiscal households across the fiscal brackets, based on their yearly tax base, if >0 and class-1 (single without dependents) or class-2 households (couples) (as resulting from EUROMOD /HFCS-R and EUROMOD /HFCS-XB).
Figure 3
Total receipts for Luxembourg (from residents and all XBs), social contributions and income taxes for all alternative systems of socio-fiscal policies (all outcomes “++” hence including “macro adjustment”, see Table 1) – Ranked based on total receipts
Figure 4
Proportion of receipts for Luxembourg from residents (in % of receipts including “macro adjustments”, see Table 1)
Figure 5
The Gini coefficient for residents and its decomposition for all alternative systems of socio-fiscal policies – in % of their STD value, ranked in decreasing values
Figure 6
The poverty rate (absolute values) and the poverty line (in % of its STD value) for residents and all alternative systems of socio-fiscal policies – Ranked in decreasing values of poverty rates
Figure 7
Gini coefficient for residents versus Total receipts, across a selection of alternative systems of socio-fiscal policies
Figure 8
Poverty rate for residents versus Gini coefficient for residents, across a selection of alternative systems of socio-fiscal policies
Tables
Table 1
An overall view of the benchmark “STD” (income year 2017) for resident and XB households
| Data and EUROMOD platforms | SILC * | HFCS-R | HFCS-XB (Active households & LU-incomes only) | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Population covered by the survey, in persons | 574,184 | 535,897 | 418,997 | ||
| Taxable Income, before Tax allowances, in millions € / year (from tinty_s in HFCS-R, or tinty_lu_s for Active XB households) | 20,808 | 20,041 | 7,947 | ||
| … out of additional amount from XBs not covered by the survey (for subsequent macro adjustment, see Section 2.4) | 1,109 | ||||
| Public Revenue (in millions € / year) | |||||
| Social contributions | 3,914 | 3,714 | 2,030 | ||
| whose | Employee | 1,820 | 1,693 | 945 | |
| Self-employed | 178 | 221 | 27 | ||
| Others (Long term care from Social assistance) | 3 | 3 | 0 | ||
| Employers | 1,710 | 1,667 | 1,059 | ||
| Credited (Replacement income, Social assistance, Pensions) | 202 | 130 | 0 | ||
| … out of additional amount from XBs not covered by the survey (for macro adjustment) | 62 | ||||
| Personal Income Tax | 3,289 | 3,439 | 824 | ||
| Implicit Tax Rate on Tax Base (tinty_s – tinta_s, or LU versions if XBs), before Tax Credits | 20.9% | 14.4% | |||
| Global Tax Rate (after Tax Allowances & Credits) = Income Tax / Taxable Income, on average | 17.2% | 10.4% | |||
| … out of additional amount from XBs not covered by the survey (for macro adjustment) | 115 | ||||
| Þ Total Public Revenue (before macro adjustment) | 7,203 | 7,153 | 2,855 | ||
| Inequalities | If All Incomes | ||||
| Gini | |||||
| Relative = Abs / (2*Avg) | 0.2524 | 0.2993 | 0.1940 | ||
| Absolute (in € / month) | 1,701 | 2,103 | 1,088 | ||
| Average (in € / month) | 3,371 | 3,513 | 2,804 | ||
| Poverty | |||||
| Line (in € / month) | 1,790 | 1,770 | 1,564 | ||
| Rate | 11% | 13% | 2% | ||
| by Type of Residence Household: | |||||
| Single (<65) | 14% | 16% | 1% | ||
| Single (65+) | 8% | 9% | 2% | ||
| Single with dependent(s) | 31% | 18% | 0% | ||
| Couple - 0 dep | 6% | 5% | 2% | ||
| Couple - 1-2 dep | 11% | 18% | 2% | ||
| Couple - 3+ dep | 14% | 21% | 2% | ||
| "Well-being", as equivalized income (all in € / month), on average | If All Incomes | ||||
| All | 3,371 | 3,513 | 2,804 | ||
| 1st Decile | 1,574 | 1,472 | 1,635 | ||
| by Type of Residence Household: | |||||
| Single (<65) | 3,308 | 3,249 | 2,828 | ||
| Single (65+) | 3,215 | 3,440 | 2,878 | ||
| Single with dependent(s) | 2,473 | 2,661 | 2,530 | ||
| Couple - 0 dep | 3,922 | 4,150 | 3,194 | ||
| Couple - 1-2 dep | 3,117 | 3,292 | 2,768 | ||
| Couple - 3+ dep | 2,673 | 2,826 | 2,353 | ||
-
Source: Liégeois (2025a) Table 2
-
*
A comparison with official statistics can be found in the EUROMOD country report for Luxembourg (https://euromod-web.jrc.ec.europa.eu/resources/country-reports - Archives - I3.0+ - Annex 2: Validation tables)
Table 2
Alternative systems of socio-fiscal policies - 1st part STD, dependency and health care
| # | Underlying Policy | Ref. | Contents (all in relation with Social Contributions)* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | BASELINE | STD | EUROMOD simulation of System presently in force “LU_2017_STD” |
| 2 | Dependency (Long Term Care) (target cf. health/in-kind, out of pensioners) (7% of social contributions in 2018)† | D1 | Deductibility (for the computation of social contribution base) from 0.25*MSW in STD down to 0% ‡ |
| 3 | D2 | Deductibility (for the computation of social contribution base) from 0.25*MSW up to 0.5*MSW | |
| 4 | D3 | Contribution rate increase from 1.4% in STD up to 1.6% of labor income (to roughly balance the higher deductibility above in [D2]) | |
| 5 | D4 | Contribution rate increase from 1.4% up to 2.4% | |
| 6 | D5 | [D2] + [D3]: Increase deductibility and balance it through a higher contribution rate | |
| 7 | Health care / in-kind (Social Contributions, including “credited”, for employ-ees/-ers, self-employed, replacement income, pensioners, social assistance) (29% of social contributions in 2018) † | H1 | Max threshold for the social contribution base from 5 MSW in STD to 7 MSW (see Section 2.2 and ‡) |
| 8 | H2 | No threshold for the social contribution base (NB: upper bound set to 1000 MSW, practically) | |
| 9 | H3 | Reduced fiscal deductibility of social contributions: from 100% (not taxable in STD) down to 50% | |
| 10 | H4 | Social contribution rates from 2.8% in STD to 3.8% (hence +2% if employ-ees/-ers altogether) | |
| 11 | H5 | Progressivity of social contrib. rates: 2.8% (resp. 3.8%) for that part of labor income < 2 (resp. >=2) MSW | |
| 12 | H6 | Progressivity of social contrib. rates: 1.8% (resp. 3.8%) for that part of labor income < 2 (resp. >=2) * MSW | |
| 13 | H7 | [H5] + [H1]: Progressivity (2.8%/3.8%) and max threshold to 7 MSW | |
| 14 | H8 | [H6] + [H1]: Progressivity (1.8%/3.8%) and max threshold to 7 MSW | |
| 15 | H9 | [H5] + [H2]: Progressiv. (2.8%/3.8%) and no threshold | |
| 16 | HA | [H5] + [H2] + [H3]: Progressivity (2.8%/3.8%), no threshold and fiscal deductibility to 50% only |
-
*
For details about “STD” and reference parameters or policies, refer to Islam et al. (2020).
-
†
Source: EUROMOD Country Report for LU, Y12 (2018-2021), Table 4.8 (page 73), Employee / Self-employed, Employer and Credited contributions, from External sources and for Residents only.
-
‡
Minimum Social Wage (MSW, Section 2.2): 1.998,59 EUR/month as on 1 January 2017. In STD, 25% of this amount is deducted from the social contribution base (gross labor income) before deriving social contributions (some % of the base).
Table 3
Alternative systems of socio-fiscal policies - 2nd part - pensions
| # | Underlying Policy | Ref. | Contents (all in relation with Social Contributions)* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 17 | Pensions (Social Contributions, including “credited”, for employ-ees/ers, self-employed, replacement income) (60% of social contributions in 2018) Source: cf. [***] in Table 2 | P1 | Max threshold for the social contribution base from 5 MSW in STD to 6 MSW† |
| 18 | P2 | Max threshold from 5 MSW to 7 MSW | |
| 19 | P3 | No threshold for the social contribution base (NB: upper bound set to 1000 MSW, practically) | |
| 20 | P4 | Social contribution rate from 8% in STD to 9% both for employees and employers (hence +2% altogether) | |
| 21 | P5 | [P4] + [P2]: Rate from 8% to 9% and max threshold to 7 MSW | |
| 22 | P6 | [P4] + [P3]: Rate from 8% to 9% and no threshold | |
| 23 | P7 | Progressivity of social contribution rates: 8% (resp. 9%) for that part of labor income < 2 (resp. >=2) * MSW | |
| 24 | P8 | Progressivity: 7% (resp. 9%) for that part of labor income < 2 (resp. >=2) MSW | |
| 25 | P9 | [P8] + [P2]: Progressivity (7% and 9%) and max threshold for the social contribution base to 7 MSW | |
| 26 | PA | Progressivity: 9% (resp. 10%) for that part of labor income < 2 (resp. >=2) * MSW | |
| 27 | PB | [PA] + [P3]: Progressivity : 9% (resp. 10%) and no threshold | |
| 28 | PC | Social contribution rate from 8% to 12% for employees/-ers | |
| 29 | PD | CSV: cf. [P1] +Contribution Solidarité Vieillesse / CSV: 5% flat rate with the Minimum Pension (“MP” = 1771.75 €/month in 2017) deducted from the contribution base (pension income) at individual level ; no deductibility from income tax base & No Threshold for CSV | |
| 30 | PE | CSV: cf. [PD], but 25% of MP deducted from the contribution base (pension income) only | |
| 31 | PF | CSV: [PD] + [P6] (social contribution rate to 9% and no max threshold) | |
| 32 | PG | CSV: cf. [PD], hence [P1], but Proportional Tax for CSV (flat, but increasing with class of pension income): 0% if social contrib. base <= MP, 1.4% if base in ]MP, 2*MP], 2.8% if base in ]2*MP, 3*MP] and 4.2% if base > 3*MP | |
| 33 | PH | CSV: cf. [PD], hence [P1], but Progressive Tax for CSV (cf. Income tax), same rates and limits as in PG |
-
*
For details about parameters or policies in our benchmark “STD”, refer to Islam et al. (2020).
-
†
Minimum Social Wage (MSW, Section 2.2): 1.998,59 EUR/month as on 1 January 2017.
Table 4
Alternative systems of socio-fiscal policies - 3rd part - income taxes
| # | Underlying Policy | Ref. | Contents (all in relation with Income Taxes)* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 34 | Personal Income Taxes (Tax schedule) (equivalent to 86% of social contributions in 2018) Source: cf. [***] in Table 2 | I1 | Brackets unchanged but higher Rates for higher Brackets: 45.897 € and more (40%, rather than 39% in STD), then 42% (40% in STD), 44% (41% in STD) and 46% for higher brackets (42% in STD) |
| 35 | I2 | More higher brackets and higher Rates: 39% up to 100.000 € (100 K), 40% up to 150 K, 41% up to 200 K -up to here as in STD-, then 42% up to 300 K, 44% up to 400 K, 46% up to 500 K, 48% up to 600 K, 50% up to 700 K, 52% up to 800 K, 54% up to 1000 K and 56% over 1000 K | |
| 36 | I3 | Idem [I1] but “class-1a” (Section 2.2) dropped and merged to class-2 | |
| 37 | I4 | Lower Rates for lower (unchanged) brackets: 0%, 2%, 4%, 6%, 8%, 10%, 12%, 14% and 17% respectively for the 9 first tax brackets (0%, 8%, 9%, 10%, 11%, 12%, 14%, 16% and 18% in STD), then unchanged compared to STD | |
| 38 | I5 | Enlargement of lower Brackets (Rates unchanged): 0 € ; 16,000 € ; 17,000 € ; 18,000 € ; 19,000 € and [20,000 € – 20,625 €] for the 6th bracket (0 € ; 11,265 € ; 13,137 € ; 15,009 € ; 16,881 € and [18,753 € - 29,625 €] in STD) | |
| 39 | I6 | All combined [I1] + [I4] + [I5]: higher Rates for higher Brackets and enlargement of lower Brackets (with lower Rates) |
-
*
For details about our benchmark “STD” and reference parameters or policies, refer to Islam et al. (2020).
Table 5
Alternative systems of socio-fiscal policies - Final part combining instruments for a global target
| # | Combined Policy | Ref. | Contents | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 40 | Combination of policies to target an additional funding of 2.77 billion € / year (EUROMOD-base) | C1 | [P6] + ([H2] + [H4]) +([D1] + [D4]) + I1 | “C” (as first letter) for “Combination” of policies, here based on all maximally funding tracks through Pensions (without CSV), Health, Dependency and Income tax Reminder: [P6] = social contribution rate from 8% to 9% & no threshold / [PB] = progressivity 9% and 10% & no threshold / [PC] = 8% to 12% with threshold (5 MSW) |
| 41 | C2 | [PB] + ([H2] + [H4]) +([D1] + [D4]) + I1 | ||
| 42 | C3 | [PC] + ([H2] + [H4]) +([D1] + [D4]) + I1 | ||
| 43 | C4 | [C1] + [PG] | Social contribution rate for pensions from 8% to 9%, no threshold and CSV with proportional rate (hence flat, but increasing with the class of income) |
Table 6
Selected basic indicators and normalized values for STD
| Basic Indicator considered ß | C1-C4 ß | Min | Max | STD | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMIN * | Alternative | IMAX [**] | Alternative | ISTD | Normalized index iSTD (if Cx included) * | ||
| Gini coefficient(residents) | Included | 0.2922 | C4 | 0.3004 | PC | 0.2993 | 0.138 * |
| Excluded | 0.2939 | I3 | |||||
| Poverty Rate(residents) | Included | 12.6% | C4 | 14.7% | I3 | 13.2% | 0.697 |
| Excluded | 12.6% | PE | |||||
| Total Receipts for Luxembourg(in millions €/year) | Included | 9,849 | I6 | 12,432 | C3 | 10,185 | 0.130 |
| Excluded | 11,558 | PC | |||||
-
*
See Section 4.2 - The Gini normalized value gSTD directly computed from this table = (0.3004 – 0.2993) / (0.3004 - 0.2922) = 0.134 is slightly deviating from the “effective” value 0.138 mentioned in the table, due to rounding effects
Table 7
A few alternatives emphasized throughout this study
| Criteria and Main values | If considering the combined alternatives C1-C4 (see also Table B1) | If excluding C1-C4 (see also Table B2) |
|---|---|---|
| Total Receipts (social contributions + personal income taxes ; residents + XBs) [Min: 8,849 - STD : 10,185 - Max : 12,432], in million € / year | C3: best C4: 2nd best I6: the worst alternative (but that can also be shown as the best for well-being) | PC: best PF: 2nd best |
| Poverty rate among Residents (proportion of persons under 60% of the median equivalent income) [Min: 12.6% - STD: 13.2% - Max: 14.7%] | C4: best PE: 2nd best | PE: best HA: 2nd best |
| Gini inequality coefficient among residents (mean absolute equivalent income gap divided by twice the average equivalent income) [Min: 0.2922 - STD : 0.2993 - Max : 0.3004] | C4: best C2: 2nd best | I3: best I6: 2nd best |
| General Performance Index (GPI) | C4: best balanced (if weights = 0.3/Gini, 0.3/poverty, 0.4/receipts) C2: 2nd best balanced | PF: best balanced (if weights = 0.3/Gini, 0.3/poverty, 0.4/receipts) HA: 2nd best balanced |
Table A1
Correlations between an ad hoc selection of basic outcome indicators
| Correlations | Total Receipts | Receipts from Residents | Receipts from XBs | GINI Residents | POVERTY Residents | POVERTY - Single Resident Households with Dependents | WELL-BEING Residents | GINI XBs | POVERTY XBs | WELL-BEING XBs |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Receipts | 1.00 | |||||||||
| Receipts from Residents | 1.00 | 1.00 | ||||||||
| Receipts from XBs | 0.99 | 0.97 | 1.00 | |||||||
| GINI Residents | -0.40 | -0.45 | -0.26 | 1.00 | ||||||
| POVERTY Residents | -0.11 | -0.14 | -0.05 | -0.01 | 1.00 | |||||
| POVERTY - Single Resident Households with Dependents | -0.21 | -0.23 | -0.16 | -0.08 | 0.82 | 1.00 | ||||
| WELL-BEING Residents | -0.97 | -0.98 | -0.93 | 0.49 | 0.23 | 0.33 | 1.00 | |||
| GINI XBs | -0.42 | -0.44 | -0.35 | 0.68 | 0.19 | -0.07 | 0.44 | 1.00 | ||
| POVERTY XBs | -0.81 | -0.79 | -0.82 | 0.10 | 0.41 | 0.47 | 0.81 | 0.38 | 1.00 | |
| WELL-BEING XBs | -0.98 | -0.97 | -0.98 | 0.28 | 0.16 | 0.30 | 0.96 | 0.35 | 0.87 | 1.00 |
-
Note to the reader: the correlations refer to the outcomes for all (43) alternatives ; indicators referring to XBs are shown in blue fonts (these refer to the populations covered by the HFCS-XB survey, out of the (total) Receipts from XBs which are macro-adjusted for “non-active” XB households).
Table B1
Global performance index, given weights for Gini coefficient, poverty rate and total receipts (in million € / year) All alternatives considered (including the combined systems C1-C4)
| p.m. RECEIPTS (in millions €/year) (Min: 9,849 - Max : 12,432) | ||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GINI (Min: 0.2922 - Max : 0.3004) a ß | POVERTY / b Þ (Min: 12.6% - Max: 14.7%) | 0 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 1 | |||||||||
| Best Systems, "Cx" INCLUDED | 1st Best | 2nd Best | 3rd Best | 1st Best | 2nd Best | 3rd Best | 1st Best | 2nd Best | 3rd Best | 1st Best | 2nd Best | 3rd Best | ||
| 0 | INDIC | STD | C3 | C4 | C2 | C3 | C4 | C2 | C4 | C2 | C1 | C4 | PE | HA |
| REC | 10,185 | 12,432 | 11,670 | 11,655 | 12,432 | 11,670 | 11,655 | 11,670 | 11,655 | 11,557 | 11,670 | 10,361 | 10,488 | |
| GINI_R | 0.2993 | 0.2971 | 0.2922 | 0.2927 | 0.2971 | 0.2922 | 0.2927 | 0.2922 | 0.2927 | 0.2935 | 0.2922 | 0.2985 | 0.2964 | |
| POV_R | 13.2% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 13.0% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 13.0% | 12.6% | 13.0% | 13.0% | 12.6% | 12.6% | 12.7% | |
| 0.3 | INDIC | STD | C3 | C4 | C2 | C4 | C2 | C1 | C4 | C2 | C1 | |||
| REC | 10,185 | 12,432 | 11,670 | 11,655 | 11,670 | 11,655 | 11,557 | 11,670 | 11,655 | 11,557 | ||||
| GINI_R | 0.2993 | 0.2971 | 0.2922 | 0.2927 | 0.2922 | 0.2927 | 0.2935 | 0.2922 | 0.2927 | 0.2935 | ||||
| POV_R | 13.2% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 13.0% | 12.6% | 13.0% | 13.0% | 12.6% | 13.0% | 13.0% | ||||
| 0.6 | INDIC | STD | C4 | C2 | C1 | C4 | C2 | C1 | ||||||
| REC | 10,185 | 11,670 | 11,655 | 11,557 | 11,670 | 11,655 | 11,557 | |||||||
| GINI_R | 0.2993 | 0.2922 | 0.2927 | 0.2935 | 0.2922 | 0.2927 | 0.2935 | |||||||
| POV_R | 13.2% | 12.6% | 13.0% | 13.0% | 12.6% | 13.0% | 13.0% | |||||||
| 1 | INDIC | STD | C4 | C2 | C1 | |||||||||
| REC | 10,185 | 11,670 | 11,655 | 11,557 | ||||||||||
| GINI_R | 0.2993 | 0.2922 | 0.2927 | 0.2935 | ||||||||||
| POV_R | 13.2% | 12.6% | 13.0% | 13.0% | ||||||||||
Table B2
Global Performance Index, given weights for Gini coefficient, poverty rate and total Receipts (in million € / year) - All alternatives (excluding the combined systems C1-C4)
| p.m. RECEIPTS (in millions €/year) (Min: 9,849 - Max : 11,558) | ||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GINI (Min: 0.2939 - Max : 0.3004) a ß | POVERTY / b (Min: 12.6% - Max: 14.7%) | 0 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 1 | |||||||||
| Best Systems, “CX” EXCLUDED | 1st Best | 2nd Best | 3rd Best | 1st Best | 2nd Best | 3rd Best | 1st Best | 2nd Best | 3rd Best | 1st Best | 2nd Best | 3rd Best | ||
| 0 | INDIC | STD | PC | PF | PB | PC | PF | PB | PF | HA | PE | PE | HA | PF |
| REC | 10,185 | 11,558 | 10,793 | 10,782 | 11,558 | 10,793 | 10,782 | 10,793 | 10,488 | 10,361 | 10,361 | 10,488 | 10,793 | |
| GINI_R | 0.2993 | 0.3004 | 0.2957 | 0.2960 | 0.3004 | 0.2957 | 0.2960 | 0.2957 | 0.2964 | 0.2985 | 0.2985 | 0.2964 | 0.2957 | |
| POV_R | 13.2% | 13.7% | 12.8% | 13.2% | 13.7% | 12.8% | 13.2% | 12.8% | 12.7% | 12.6% | 12.6% | 12.7% | 12.8% | |
| 0.3 | INDIC | STD | PC | PF | PB | PF | HA | PB | HA | PF | PE | |||
| REC | 10,185 | 11,558 | 10,793 | 10,782 | 10,793 | 10,488 | 10,782 | 10,488 | 10,793 | 10,361 | ||||
| GINI_R | 0.2993 | 0.3004 | 0.2957 | 0.2960 | 0.2957 | 0.2964 | 0.2960 | 0.2964 | 0.2957 | 0.2985 | ||||
| POV_R | 13.2% | 13.7% | 12.8% | 13.2% | 12.8% | 12.7% | 13.2% | 12.7% | 12.8% | 12.6% | ||||
| 0.6 | INDIC | STD | I3 | PF | PB | PF | HA | PB | ||||||
| REC | 10,185 | 10,221 | 10,793 | 10,782 | 10,793 | 10,488 | 10,782 | |||||||
| GINI_R | 0.2993 | 0.2939 | 0.2957 | 0.2960 | 0.2957 | 0.2964 | 0.2960 | |||||||
| POV_R | 13.2% | 14.7% | 12.8% | 13.2% | 12.8% | 12.7% | 13.2% | |||||||
| 1 | INDIC | STD | I3 | I6 | PF | |||||||||
| REC | 10,185 | 10,221 | 9,849 | 10,793 | ||||||||||
| GINI_R | 0.2993 | 0.2939 | 0.2945 | 0.2957 | ||||||||||
| POV_R | 13.2% | 14.7% | 14.0% | 12.8% | ||||||||||
Data and code availability
The analysis builds on data from [i] the “European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions” (EU-SILC) survey Wave 16, available for scientific research upon request to EUROSTAT, [ii] the third wave of the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) for residents, available for scientific research upon request to the European Central Bank, [iii] the third wave of the Luxembourg Household Finance and Consumption Survey for Cross-Border Commuters (for access requests, contact the Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research at dataservice@liser.lu or marc.schneider@liser.lu) and [iv] the EU-wide micro-simulation model EUROMOD (I4.62+ Beta release / 3.4.10) available upon request to the EU-Joint Research Center in Seville.
Details of STATA routines for the creation of the EUROMOD input datasets from HFCS raw data and specific policy codes are available from the author upon request.
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